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Humans make predictions and use feedback to update their subsequent predictions. The
feedback-related negativity (FRN) has been found to be sensitive to negative feedback
as well as negative prediction error, such that the FRN is larger for outcomes that are
worse than expected. The present study examined prediction errors in both appetitive and
aversive conditions. We found that the FRN was more negative for reward omission vs.
wins and for loss omission vs. losses, suggesting that the FRN might classify outcomes in
a “more-or-less than expected” fashion rather than in the “better-or-worse than expected”
dimension. Our findings challenge the previous notion that the FRN only encodes negative
feedback and “worse than expected” negative prediction error.
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INTRODUCTION
Human beings can learn from the consequences of their actions.
Rapidly evaluating the external feedback information and using
it to guide future actions are important for human behavior.
Such learning depends on the ability of the brain to discrimi-
nate between positive feedback indicating that the behavior was
appropriate and negative feedback indicating that the behavior
was inappropriate (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004). Recent studies have
used event-related potentials (ERP) to examine how feedback is
processed in the human brain. A component of event-related
potential, named feedback-related negativity (FRN), is believed
to be more sensitive to negative feedback, such as incorrectness
or monetary losses (Falkenstein et al., 1991; Miltner et al., 1997;
Gehring andWilloughby, 2002). The FRN, which peaks at around
250ms after feedback onset, is maximal at frontal-central scalp
electrode sites and is most likely generated in the anterior cingu-
late cortex (ACC) (Miltner et al., 1997; Gehring and Willoughby,
2002). The FRN is believed to reflect the binary evaluation of
good vs. bad outcomes (Holroyd and Coles, 2002; Hajcak et al.,
2006). The reverse inference that more negative FRN implies the
encoding of more negative values has been used in social decision
making studies, e.g., studies using unfair outcomes as feedback
(Polezzi et al., 2008; Boksem and De Cremer, 2010).
The reinforcement learning (RL) theory of the FRN proposes
that the FRN amplitude depends on the relation between actual
and expected outcomes. Differences between actual and expected
outcomes or prediction errors provide teaching signals to select
advantageous actions (Sutton and Barto, 1998; Nieuwenhuis
et al., 2004). Holroyd and Coles (2002) have proposed that the
FRN was produced by the impact of reinforcement learning sig-
nals carried by the mesencephlic dopamine system in the ACC.
In particular, this research indicated that when events are better
than expected, the basal ganglia induce a phasic increase, whereas
when events are worse than expected, the basal ganglia induce a
phasic decrease. Therefore, differences in expectations of rewards
should modulate the size of prediction error signals (Holroyd and
Coles, 2002). However, regarding whether the magnitude of the
FRN is also modulated by reward expectation, previous studies
have demonstrated inconsistent findings.
In one study, researchers manipulated feedback frequency in a
gambling task and found that the magnitude of FRN was larger
for infrequent feedback than for frequent feedback (Holroyd
et al., 2003). In this study, participants were informed about
the frequency explicitly. However, Hajcak et al. (2005) found
that the FRN did not differ as a function of expectancy in two
experiments in which reward frequency information was either
explicitly presented to subjects on a trial-by-trial basis or it is
learned by participants in a block, suggesting that the FRN was
insensitive to reward probability. In another study, Hajcak et al.
(2007) found that the magnitude of the FRN was sensitive to vio-
lations of reward prediction, but this effect might depend on the
close coupling of prediction and outcome: the FRN was sensi-
tive to frequency only when participants made reward predictions
after but not before gambling choices (Hajcak et al., 2007). This
study suggests that the FRN was modulated by expectation only
when the prediction was made following a response and imme-
diately before receiving feedback. However, these studies mainly
examined the FRN in the appetitive domain (involving only wins
and no wins). It is currently unclear how the FRN responds to
prediction errors in the aversive domain. Recently, an electroen-
cephalography (EEG) study found that the probability of reward
modulated neural responses to wins, but not to losses (Cohen
et al., 2007). In addition, power and phase coherence values
following wins but not losses were modulated by reward prob-
ability. These findings suggest that there may be different neural
mechanisms underlying feedback processing in wins and in losses
(Cohen et al., 2007).
According to the reinforcement learning theory, the FRN is
associated with events that are worse than expected. However,
this idea has been challenged in several previous studies. In one
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study, participants were asked to evaluate the correctness of their
own response and were given the real feedback on their perfor-
mance. The FRN was observed for both unexpected “correct”
and “incorrect” feedbacks, regardless of the motivational value
(Oliveira et al., 2007). It has been shown that midbrain dopamine
neurons not only respond to rewards but also to transmit signals
related to salient but non-reward experiences (Bromberg-Martin
et al., 2010). Another study found that the FRN not only reflects
a negative reward prediction error, but also a positive reward
prediction error (Pfabigan et al., 2011). The researchers pro-
posed that the FRN reflects the mismatch between internal and
external representations and detects the motivational salience of
outcomes (Pfabigan et al., 2011). A recent study found that unex-
pected physical pain omission (a positive reward prediction error)
also yielded a more negative FRN than unexpected pain delivery,
suggesting that FRN expresses salience prediction errors rather
than reward prediction errors (Talmi et al., 2013). In addition,
an EEG-functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study
demonstrated that additional activations of the salience network
and surprise signals modulate the FRN amplitude (Hauser et al.,
2014), consistent with the recent theory that dopamine neurons
also encode surprise-like saliency signals (Redgrave and Gurney,
2006; Matsumoto and Hikosaka, 2009; Bromberg-Martin et al.,
2010).
Taken together, it is possible that the FRN encodes prediction
errors associated with motivational salience rather than moti-
vational value. The reason why FRN is typically more negative
for losses than rewards probably might be that losses are more
motivationally salient (Oliveira et al., 2007). In the present study,
we designed conditioning learning experiments, involving both
appetitive and aversive conditions, to address these underlying
issues. We hypothesized that in appetitive condition, the FRN
would be more negative in response to no win outcome (nega-
tive omitted outcome) than to win outcome (positive delivered
outcome). But the FRN would be reversed in aversive conditions,
with no losses (positive omitted outcome) outcome being more
negative than loss outcome (negative delivered outcome). Such
FRN patterns will present an important challenge for the RL the-
ory. In the appetitive condition, the outcome was either win or no
win. In the aversive condition, the outcome was either loss or no
loss. The no win and no loss outcomes were “omitted” feedback,
i.e., less than expected. We also sought to examine how explicit




Fifteen healthy, right-handed participants (4 male; mean age
± SD, 20.93 ± 1.53 years) participated in return for pay-
ment. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision,
reported that they had no neurological or psychiatric disorders.
All participants were right-handed, according to the Edinburgh
Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971). The study was approved
by the Academic Committee of the School of Psychology at
South China Normal University. All participants gave written,
informed consent and were informed of their right to discontinue
participation at any time.
EXPERIMENTAL PARADIGM
At the beginning of each trial, participants were presented with
a pie chart which explicitly indicated the true frequencies of out-
comes for 1 s. Then the feedback of outcome was shown for 1 s,
followed by a 500ms blank. There were 4 kinds of outcomes:
win, no win, lose and no loss. We varied the amount of reward
in order to entertain subjects so that they can maintain a high
level of vigilance and interest in the task. The amount of win-
ning and losing varied from 10 to 39, with an increment
of 1. The win and no win feedbacks in the appetitive condi-
tion were highlighted with green background and the loss and
no loss feedbacks in the aversive condition were highlighted with
red background. The assignment of background color to exper-
imental conditions was counterbalanced across participants. In
order to increase participants’ engagement, they were required
to confirm the type of feedbacks by pressing the correspond-
ing keys within 1 s. Unknown to the participants, the association
between cues and feedback was pre-determined and cue identity
and experimental conditions were counterbalanced across par-
ticipants. As shown in Figure 1, in the appetitive condition in
which only wins and no win were possible, one cue was asso-
ciated with reward with 70% probability and the other cue was
associated with reward with 30% probability. In the aversive
FIGURE 1 | Experimental task design. Participants were presented with a
pie chart which explicitly indicated the true frequencies of outcomes for 1 s.
Then the feedback of outcome was shown for 1 s, followed by a 500ms
blank.
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condition in which only losses and no loss were possible, one cue
was associated with losses with 70% probability and the other was
associated with losses with 30% probability. The experiment was
consisted of three blocks of 200 trials each. The two conditions
were randomized across blocks and participants. There were 100
“appetitive condition” trials and 100 “aversive condition” trials
in each block. All the participants received a base payment of 30
yuan (about 5 US dollar).
After the EEG session, participants were required to indicate
their feelings of surprise about the eight types of outcomes on
a 10-point Likert scale. After completion of the experiment, one
trial was randomly selected and the outcome was multiplied by
a rate (0.5) which was unknown to subjects before the experi-
ment. The amount of winning was added to the base payment.
The amount of losing was subtracted from the base payment.
ERP RECORDING AND ANALYSIS
Standard ERP recording and analysis were applied. EEGs were
recorded from 32 scalp sites using Ag/AgCl electrodes embed-
ded in an elastic cap (NeuroScan Inc., USA) according to the
international 10–20 system, with the reference to the right
mastoid. Eye blinks were recorded from electrodes located
above and below the left eye. The horizontal electro-oculogram
(EOG) was recorded from electrodes placed 1.5 cm lateral to
the left and right external canthi. All electrode impedances
were maintained below 5 k. The EEG and EOG were
recorded from SynAmps AC amplifiers using a 0.5–70Hz band-
pass and continuously sampled at 500Hz/channel for off-line
analysis.
The EEG data were re-referenced offline to linked-mastoid
electrodes by subtracting 50% of the signal in the right mastoid
electrode from the signal in each channel. Ocular artifacts were
corrected with an eye-movement correction algorithm (Gratton
et al., 1983). All trials in which EEG voltages exceeded a thresh-
old of ±70µV during the recoding epoch were excluded from
analysis. The EEG data were filtered using a 1–20Hz band-pass
(24 dB octave roll off) for the FRN. The EEG data were baseline
corrected by subtracting from each sample the average activity
of that channel during the baseline period. Epochs of 800ms
(with 200ms pre-stimulus baseline) EEG from each electrode
were time-locked to the onset of feedback and were sorted by
experimental conditions.
The FRN was measured as the mean amplitude in the time
window 200–320ms post-onset of the outcome stage. We focused
on the FRN responses on the anterior frontal midline electrodes
(Fz), since the FRN effects were the largest on this electrode.




For the self-reported surprise in response to outcomes
(Figure 2A), the 3-Way repeated-measure ANOVA using
frequency (70 vs. 30%), outcome (“omitted” feedback vs.
“delivered” feedback) and domain (appetitive vs. aversive)
as independent factors revealed a significant main effect of
frequency, F(1, 14) = 22.33, p < 0.001. Participants felt more
surprise for infrequent outcomes (5.85 ± 0.31) than for frequent
outcomes (3.52 ± 0.0.53). The other effects were not significant,
p > 0.1.
For the reaction times (RTs) (Figure 2B), the 3-Way ANOVA
revealed a significant main effect of frequency, F(1, 14) = 33.75,
p < 0.001. Participants reacted more quickly for frequent out-
comes (527.50ms ± 15.46) than for infrequent outcomes
(602.94ms± 11.98).We also found a significant interaction effect
between domain and outcome, F(1, 14) = 5.56. p = 0.034. The
difference between delivered outcomes and omitted outcomes
was larger in appetitive domain (−20.49± 10.80) than in aver-
sive domain (3.44 ± 9.80). The other effects were not significant,
p > 0.1.
ERP RESULTS
For the outcome evoked FRN (Figures 3A,B), the 3-Way
repeated- measures ANOVA using frequency (70 vs. 30%), out-
come (“omitted” feedback vs. “delivered” feedback) and domain
(appetitive vs. aversive) as independent factors revealed a signif-
icant main effect of outcome, F(1, 14) = 31.94, p < 0.001, with
more negative FRN responding to omitted feedbacks (0.32µV ±
0.44) than to delivered feedbacks (2.07µV ± 0.45). The main
effect of frequency was also significant, F(1, 14) = 16.71, p =
0.001, with more negative FRN responding to infrequent out-
comes (0.57µV ± 0.46) than to frequent outcomes (1.82µV ±
0.42), suggesting that the FRN was sensitive to the expectation
of outcomes. The main effect of domain was also significant,
FIGURE 2 | Self-reported surprise (A) and reaction times (B) in response to outcomes. W, win; NW, no win; L, loss; NL, no loss.
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FIGURE 3 | The ERP grand-average waveforms and topographical maps. Grand-average waveforms and different waveforms at channel Fz for the
appetitive condition (A) and the aversive condition (B).
F(1, 14) = 5.65, p = 0.032, with more negative FRN respond-
ing to the appetitive domain than to the aversive domain. The
interaction effect between domain and outcome was significant,
F(1, 14) = 12.80, p = 0.003. The difference of FRN amplitude
between omitted feedbacks and delivered feedbacks was larger in
aversive condition (−2.42µV ± 0.32) than in appetitive condi-
tion (−1.08µV ± 0.40). The other effects were not significant,
p > 0.05.
DISCUSSION
In the present study, we examined whether and how the FRN
evaluates the valence (delivered feedback and omitted feedback)
and expectation of feedback in appetitive and aversive condi-
tions. We found that the FRN was sensitive to the valence of
feedback in both appetitive and aversive conditions. Contrary to
the finding of (Holroyd et al., 2004), the FRN we obtained is
more negative for omitted outcomes than delivered outcomes in
both appetitive and aversive conditions. In appetitive context, the
FRN was more negative in the no win condition (i.e., “omitted”
feedback) than in the win condition. Importantly, in aversive con-
text, the FRN was more negative in the no loss condition (i.e.,
“omitted” feedback) than in the loss condition. We also found
that the FRN was strongly modulated by expectation when the
frequencies of outcomes were explicitly indicated by cues. The
FRN elicited by infrequent conditions were more negative than
frequent conditions in both appetitive and aversive contexts.
The FRN has been used as an index of negative feedback pro-
cessing since the majority of studies showed more negative FRN
for the worse available outcomes. However, our study demon-
strated that the no loss feedback elicited more negative FRN than
loss, although no loss is clearly better than loss. Our findings are
in line with a recent study which found that the FRN expresses
salience prediction errors rather than reward prediction errors
(Talmi et al., 2013). In that study, the appetitive (i.e., mone-
tary reward) and aversive (i.e., physical pain) conditions were
presented in different blocks. In the reward session, they found
that unexpected reward omissions (a negative reward prediction
error) yielded a more negative deflection relative to unexpected
reward delivery. In the pain session, they found that unexpected
pain omission (a positive reward prediction error) also yielded a
negative deflection relative to unexpected pain delivery. Monetary
gain in appetitive condition is a secondary reinforcer, while pain
in the aversive condition is a primary reinforcer. Thus, differ-
ence in reward and pain may be due to the difference in primary
and secondary reinforce rather than to the difference in appet-
itive/aversive domain. One advantage of our design is that we
used money as the only modality which makes the appetitive and
aversive conditions more comparable. Moreover, we presented
gains/losses in the same block rather than separate them into dif-
ferent sessions. Our study strengthens the notion that the FRN
encodes salience prediction error (“more or less”) rather than
reward prediction error (“better or worse”).
Our current study, together with several previous studies, sug-
gests that caution in the interpretation of the FRN as an index of
negative values should be applied. The RL theory proposed that
the FRN reflected the impact on ACC of a negative reward predic-
tion error signal, conveyed by the midbrain dopamine system that
was generated when ongoing events were worse than expected
(Holroyd and Coles, 2002). However, in previous two studies, the
FRN amplitudes elicited by negative and neutral outcomes did
not differ, but the FRN associated with “omitted” feedback was
larger than the negative feedback (Hajcak et al., 2006; Holroyd
et al., 2006). Moreover, another research found that in the loss
condition, the FRN associated with loss 0 was more negative
than loss 5 and the difference was significant (Yu and Zhou,
2006). A previous fMRI study also showed that, striatal activation
reflected positively signed prediction errors for both appetitive
and aversive, suggesting that appetitive and aversive prediction
errors may be represented in a similar manner, albeit somewhat
spatially resolvable along an axis of the striatum (Seymour et al.,
2007). Our findings are consistent with the findings that the neu-
rons in macaque dorsal ACC were more activated in response to
both large and small rewards when the outcomes were surpris-
ing. These results are inconsistent with the notion that the ACC
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encodes error signals in reward prediction (Hayden et al., 2011).
These patterns are similar to that predicted in attentional theo-
ries of learning whereby the rate of learning is modulated by the
amount of attention elicited by the outcomes. The associations
between actions and subsequent rewards are stronger when out-
comes are surprising, regardless of their valence. (Pearce and Hall,
1980; Roesch et al., 2010).
A computational model of salience suggests that a signal for
certain rewards is more salience than a signal for certain non-
reward (Esber and Haselgrove, 2011). This implies that delivered
outcome is more salient than omitted outcome. In appetitive
condition, the prediction of participants was “win,” the “omit-
ted” feedback was less than expected (i.e., absence in expected).
Therefore the FRN elicited by “omitted” feedback was more nega-
tive than elicited by win feedback. Similarly, in aversive condition,
the prediction of participants was “loss,” the “omitted” feed-
back was less than expected. Thus, the FRN elicited by “omitted”
feedback was more negative than elicited by loss feedback. No
matter in appetitive condition or aversive condition, the “omit-
ted” feedback was a neutral outcome indicating that the salient
wins or losses were absent. It is possible that the FRN reflects
“less than expected” prediction error signal rather than “worse
than expected” signal. We propose that the ACC evaluative system
that produces the FRNmight classify outcomes in a “more-or-less
than expected” fashion rather than in the “better-or-worse than
expected” dimension.
A few caveats about the present study should be mentioned.
First, our study did not capture the dynamics of participants’
prediction. The precise prediction may vary from trial to trial.
Future studies may use computational modeling to estimate the
exact prediction on a given trial. However, in the present study,
we only associated average ERP amplitude with average predic-
tion in a given trial type. We assume that participants will expect
win in high probability win trials, although the strength of such
expectation may differ across trials. Future studies may use com-
putational modeling combined with single trial ERP analysis to
further investigate the neural correlates of such dynamic predic-
tions (Chase et al., 2011; Walsh and Anderson, 2011). Second,
in our task, subjects were instructed to press a button during
the outcome period and the frontocentral ERP may be associated
with planning and preparation of the motor action. However, our
topographic maps of the FRN suggest that the FRN was mainly
generated in frontocentral regions, e.g., the ACC. Future studies
may use a passive observation task to rule out the confounding
effects of motor planning and actions. Finally, our study did not
examine the correlation between the prediction error and FRN
on a trial-by-trial basis. Previous studies have shown that the FRN
amplitude was correlated positively with negative prediction error
which was derived from a reinforcement learning model (Chase
et al., 2011). Our study only adopted two levels of probability (30
and 70%). Future studies may vary reward probability across its
full range and use single trial analyses to test whether the FRN
scales with increasingmagnitude of prediction error (Pernet et al.,
2011).
In conclusion, our study provide evidence that the FRN is not
necessarily associated with negative feedback and may reflect the
“more or less than expected” signal, e.g., delivered or omitted.
These findings, if replicated, challenge the generally accepted
notion that the FRN encodes negative feedback and “worse than
expected” prediction error and raise awareness as to the need to
revise our current understanding of the functional significance of
the FRN.
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